I am worried that, lately, I am agreeing too much with James Lee. I hope my friends will stage an intervention if I start saying things like “…this group acts by isometries on Hilbert space…”
I agree with his choice of favorite STOC’08 talks, but also with his comments on the statement on the importance of conceptual contributions in theoretical computer science, which was recently written by a group of distinguished theoreticians, was briefly discussed at the STOC’08 business meeting, and was commented upon here, here and here.
In Mr. Spritz Goes to Washington, Lisa and Homer help pass a bill to divert flights from over their house by tacking their air traffic bill on a “giving orphans American flags” bill.
I felt that the statement (and the subsequent public and private discussions) similarly mixes the unobjectionable with the potentially controversial. There have been two themes that are entirely agreeable.
One is the importance, and value, of simplicity in proofs. This goes without saying, and I think that the community does a good job in recognizing simple resolutions of long-standing open questions, as well as new simplified proofs of known results. In fact, I think it would be hard to find someone who suggests that, all other things being equal, a harder proof is preferable to a simple proof.
Another is the importance of introducing new concepts and models. Indeed, there would be no theoretical computer science without its “concepts,” and the field would die if it would stop innovating. Again, nobody could possibly argue against the importance of new definitions and models.
Then, there is something which is said in the statement in a way that is not self-evident:
Once understood, conceptual aspects tend to be viewed as obvious, which actually means that they have become fully incorporated in the worldview of the expert. This positive effect is actually a source of trouble in the evaluation process, because the evaluators forget that these contributions were not obvious at all before being made.
Indeed, our community should be warned of dismissing such contributions by saying “yes, but that’s obvious”; when somebody says such a thing, one should ask “was it obvious to you before reading this article?”
I think (and I echo things that were better said in comments that I linked to above) that if something looks obvious after reading a new paper for the first time (as opposed to looking back at a classical paper from twenty or more years ago), then the paper is not making a valuable conceptual contribution. The time that it takes to read a paper cannot be sufficient to “alter the worldview” of the reader: the concept must have been “in the air.”
To be sure, usually even the greatest discoveries are in the air when they are made, a point which I want to write about in a different post. The fundamental difference, however, is that reading about a good conceptual discovery for the first time is startling and exciting, like hearing a good joke for the first time. If an expert feels nothing when reading about a conceptual discovery, it is usually a very bad sign, although one can come up with various exceptions.
Often quoted exceptions are some early papers in the great foundations-of-cryptography revolution of 1982, especially the Goldwasser-Micali-Rackoff paper on Zero Knowledge, which ended up appearing in 1985. What was special about that line of work is that it was not in the air, but, rather, ahead of its time. Obviously, I wasn’t there, so I don’t know, but I guess that people at the time were not saying “this work is obvious,” but rather “what the hell is this?,” which is quite different.
A final remark is that when a paper presents a new model or problem (and I understand that these are the kind of papers that the statement refers to), there can be no “intrinsic” value attributed the model or the problem; the value will be in the understanding and general progress that will come by studying the model and finding solutions to the problem, and how this will connect with different problems, different models, and applications.
There seem to be only two ways to validate a new conceptual proposal: one is to present preliminary evidence that one can do interesting things with it. (I think, in this case, too much emphasis is put on achieving quantitative improvement; I am impressed enough to see known, hard, results, recovered in a completely different way.) The other is the “gut feeling” of the expert, which feels that the new ideas are the “right” way to think about the issue at hand.
It seems right to reject a paper that fails both tests.